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Abstract
This article presents the first systematic theoretical and empirical study of high-
low agreements in civil litigation. A high-low agreement is a private contract
that, if signed by litigants before trial, constrains any plaintiff’s recovery to a
specified range. In our theoretical model, trial is both costly and risky. When
litigants have divergent subjective beliefs and are mutually optimistic about their
trial prospects, cases may fail to settle. In these cases, high-low agreements can
be in litigants’ mutual interest because they limit the risk of outlier awards
while still allowing mutually beneficial speculation. Using claims data from a
national insurance company, we describe the features of these agreements and
empirically investigate the factors that may influence whether litigants discuss
or enter into them. Our empirical findings are consistent with the predictions
of the theoretical model. Other applications include the use of collars in mergers
and acquisitions.
1. Introduction
In the summer of 2004, a semitrailer truck cruising at 65 miles per hour rear-
ended a Ford pickup truck that was stopped in a line of traffic. The pickup
truck was in flames as witnesses pulled the driver, Delbert Sanders, from the
The authors are grateful to the American Bar Association Litigation Research Fund and the Searle
Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth for supporting this research and would like to
thank Richard Holden, a referee, James Dana, Andrew Daughety, John DiNardo, Jim Greiner, Sam
Gross, Eric Helland, Louis Kaplow, Kyle Logue, Jennifer Reinganum, Jesse Rothstein, Steve Shavell,
Jeff Smith, Kathy Zeiler, and seminar participants at the Harvard Law School, the National Bureau
of Economic Research, the University of Michigan, the University of Tel Aviv, Columbia Law School,
and the Searle Center’s Research Symposium on Empirical Studies of Civil Liability (at Northwestern
Law School). Spier acknowledges financial support from the JohnM. Olin Center for Law, Economics,
and Business at the Harvard Law School and National Science Foundation grant SES-1155761. Yoon
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wreckage. The driver of the semitrailer, who had been searching for his dropped
cell phone at the time of the accident, was unharmed. The semitrailer driver
and his insurer admitted liability for the accident, but they disputed the alleged
severity of Sanders’s claimed back injury. Settlement negotiations reached an
impasse—the defendants’ offer of $500,000 was far below the $1.3 million that
Sanders demanded. Both sides were shocked when the jury returned a $5.25
million verdict. Sanders never received $5.25 million, however. Instead, the de-
fendants paid only $1.5 million, all that was owed under a high-low agreement
signed by the parties before the jury rendered its verdict.1
A high-low agreement is a contract “in which a defendant agrees to pay the
plaintiff a minimum recovery in return for the plaintiff’s agreement to accept a
maximum amount regardless of the outcome of the trial” (Garner 2004, p. 746).2
High-low agreements allow both sides to hedge their bets and appear to have
become increasingly popular over the last 30 years (McDonough 2005).3 Al-
though some lawyers and judges have expressed reservations about their use,4
high-low agreements have found significant support among litigants and legal
practitioners, including judges. In the words of a Pennsylvania appeals judge,
“As a tool commonly utilized in litigation, a high/low agreement guarantees a
plaintiff a minimal recovery while concomitantly circumscribing a defendant’s
potential exposure. Court, counsel, and litigants favor them” (Thompson v. T.J.
Whipple Const. Co., 985 A.2d 221, 229 [Pa. Super. Ct. 2009]).5
In this article, we present the first systematic study of high-low agreements
in civil litigation,6 beginning with a theoretical model in which litigants can enter
would like to thank the Russell Sage Foundation and the Law School Admissions Council for their
generous financial support. We would also like to thank Jennifer Allen, Grady Bridges, Pier DeRoo,
Rachel Goldstein, Michael Gough, Seth Kingery, Ray Magnum, Jon Markman, Michael Mulvania,
and Jesse Taylor for excellent research assistance. Any errors are our own.
1 Their agreement specified a low of $300,000 and a high of $1.5 million. See Emerick (2007).
2 A related form of agreement involves giving fact finders a choice between two awards. In high-
low cases, however, fact finders often remain unaware of the agreement.
3 In Cook County, Illinois, Judge Richard Elrod estimated that high-low agreements are discussed
in 20–30 percent—and actually used in 10 percent—of the claims he sees. The exact origins of high-
low agreements are unknown. A mid-1970s article by a New York State judge describes high-low
agreements and their advantages to litigants, including risk reduction and avoidance of delay for
appeals (Finz 1976).
4 For example, according to one plaintiffs’ attorney, a high-low agreement “reduces the whole
concept of a judicial proceeding to a wager” and “make[s] a mockery of the system” (Riner 1989,
p. B2). While typically enforceable, high-low agreements have received greater scrutiny in situations
involving multiple defendants and minors. See Hoenig (2006) and Faley and Alonso (1998). See also
McDonough (2005).
5 High-low agreements are also featured in several state-sponsored alternative dispute resolution
programs. For example, they are specifically defined and applied in the statutory language of Cali-
fornia’s expedited jury trial program, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code secs. 630.01(c), 630.03 (West), and in
New York’s summary jury trial program, N.Y. R. Kings SJT Rules 12, 17 (West). Survey information
from Charleston County, North Carolina, suggests that “virtually all parties enter into a high-low
agreement when opting for a [summary jury trial].” See Hannaford-Agor et al. (2012, p. 13).
6 Coulson (1968) contains the first academic mention of high-low agreements. No detailed treat-
ment of high-low agreements exists in either the legal or economics literatures, although articles
briefly discuss them. See, for example, Gross and Syverud (1996, pp. 61–62). Because settlement
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into contracts prior to risky and costly trials. When both opposing litigants are
optimistic about their chances at trial and when litigation costs are not too large,
both parties would prefer to go to trial rather than settle. These litigants will
not necessarily opt for a “naked” trial, however. A high-low agreement that
places a ceiling and a floor on any damages award can be a prudent alternative
to a naked trial when the risk from going to trial is large and at least one litigant
is sufficiently risk averse. High-low agreements can serve these litigants’ joint
interests by limiting risk exposure at trial—thereby reducing the risk premiums
they bear—while still allowing them to benefit from their confidence in their
own cases.
We then explore the actual use of high-low agreements using claims data from
a large national insurer. More than 5 percent of litigated claims in our sample
involved discussions of high-low agreements, almost 4 percent had high-low
agreements in place when they were resolved at trial or in arbitration, and
hundreds of settled claims also involved high-low discussions or agreements. We
demonstrate that litigants’ behavior in our data set is consistent with the basic
predictions of our model. In particular, claims that are expected to be low cost
and highly volatile are more likely, relative to baseline probabilities, to involve
high-low discussions and/or result in a high-low agreement during litigation.
Importantly, we do not claim that litigants seek high-low agreements for the
reasons that we identify—only that the patterns in the data are consistent with
their doing so.
Our article contributes to the large literature on the resolution of litigation
(surveys include Spier 2007; Daughety 2000; Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989; Hay
and Spier 1998). Most civil cases in the United States settle out of court. In state
courts, fewer than 4 percent of filed cases go to trial. In federal courts, the figure
is closer to 2 percent (Ostrom et al. 2001, p. 29; Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts 2002, p. 154, table C-4). Opting out of formal litigation generally
makes economic sense: litigation is expensive, time-consuming, and risky. Given
the obvious advantages of settlement, most scholarship has focused on the factors
that motivate most parties to settle yet result in some parties proceeding to trial,
despite the costs and uncertainties of adjudication.
Beginning with the early theoretical work of Landes (1971), Posner (1973),
and Gould (1973), commentators have suggested that settlement may fail when
litigants have different subjective beliefs about the likely outcome at trial.7 More
discussions occur in private and litigants are protective of litigation-related information, the empirical
study of high-low agreements is challenging. To our knowledge, disclosure of high-low agreements
is not a codified requirement in any jurisdiction.
7 This is the approach taken here. This so-called mutual-optimism framework has been used to
explore the selection of cases for trial (Priest and Klein 1984), fee shifting (Shavell 1982), conflicts
between lawyers and clients (Miller 1987), and bifurcation of trials (Landes 1993). It has also served
as a foundation for empirical work on settlement (see Waldfogel 1998). Experimental and anecdotal
evidence indicates that litigants tend to exhibit self-serving biases (Loewenstein et al. 1993). Plaintiffs
may overestimate expected judgments at trial, while defendants may underestimate them. See Bar-
Gill (2006) on the strategic advantages of self-serving biases and Yildiz (2003, 2004) for more recent
theoretical work on bargaining without common priors.
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recent work shows that cases may fail to settle when litigants are asymmetrically
informed about certain aspects of the litigation (P’ng 1983; Bebchuk 1984;
Reinganum and Wilde 1986; Nalebuff 1987; Spier 1992). An active empirical
literature explores why and when litigants will settle out of court, examining,
for example, the role of the damages at stake, litigants’ appetites for risk, and
the possibility of reputation effects.8 In these literatures, settlement is almost
always viewed as a simple transfer payment from a defendant to a plaintiff in
exchange for forgoing further pursuit of a claim.9 In contrast, we allow litigants
to commit to future transfer payments that are conditional on an outcome at
trial, and we show that partial settlements in the form of high-low agreements
can serve the parties’ joint interests.10
Our analysis may also provide insight into contracting practices outside of
litigation, such as the use of collars in corporate merger agreements. Collars are
common in stock mergers in which target shareholders are paid in bidders’
stock.11 A fixed-exchange-ratio collar, for example, specifies a constant ratio of
exchange over a prespecified range of bidder stock prices—with restrictions
outside of this range. To illustrate, when First Union bid to acquire BancFlorida
in 1994, it promised BancFlorida’s shareholders .669 of a share of its stock for
each BancFlorida share if First Union’s stock price was between $41.875 and
$44.875. If the stock was trading below $41.875 or above $44.875, however,
shareholders would instead receive $28 or $30 worth of stock per share, re-
spectively.12 Thus, BancFlorida shareholders were assured between $28 and $30
per share, with the exact price in that range determined by First Union’s stock
value at the time of the transaction. Following the logic of our article, we see
that fixed-exchange-ratio collars may allow both the bidder and target share-
8 For examples of this work, see Danzon and Lillard (1983), Farber and White (1991), Kessler et
al. (1996), Fournier and Zuehlke (1996), Fenn and Rickman (1999), Viscusi (1988), and Kessler and
Rubinfeld (2004). Sieg (2000) and Watanabe (2005) present structural econometric models of set-
tlement. Yoon (2004), Snyder and Hughes (1990), and Hughes and Snyder (1995) explore the effects
of various tort reforms. Other work examines the selection effects at trial. See Waldfogel (1995),
Kessler et al. (1996), Eisenberg and Farber (1997), and Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999).
9 A notable exception is a literature that applies the mechanism design techniques of Myerson
(1979) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to settlement. Spier (1994) and Klement and Neeman
(2005) consider direct-revelation mechanisms, where the transfer payments depend on the litigants’
pretrial announcements as well as the outcome at trial. Legal scholars have cautioned against the
use of the trial-settlement dichotomy (Eisenberg and Lanvers 2008; Clermont and Schwab 2008;
Hadfield 2004).
10 Donohue (1991) studies the idea that parties who are not content with the fee-shifting rule in
their jurisdiction can privately contract for an alternative rule. He notes, however, the dearth of
evidence of these contracts in practice. We find ample real-world evidence of high-low agreements.
11 There is a large literature exploring the choice between cash offers and stock offers in mergers
and acquisitions. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that bidders will make a stock offer when they
believe their stock to be overvalued; Hansen (1987) argues that stock offers can mitigate the lemons
problem when targets are privately informed. Relatively little has been written on collars, however.
Using data on abnormal bidder returns at the time of merger announcements, Houston and Ryngaert
(1997) argue that the use of collars is consistent with the asymmetric-information theories. See also
Fuller (2003) and Officer (2004).
12 See BancFlorida Financial Corporation, 8-K filing with Securities and Exchange Comm’n (Jan-
uary 17, 1994). Officer (2004) also uses this example and describes other types of collars as well.
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holders to speculate on the basis of their divergent priors about the future price
of the bidder’s stock (owing perhaps to different beliefs about any synergies
resulting from the merger) while at the same time insulating potentially risk
averse parties (for example, large block shareholders or owners of closely held
target firms) from bearing excessive risk from the transaction.13
We begin the rest of the article in the next section by augmenting the standard
out-of-court settlement model to allow litigants to modify future trial outcomes
by contract, and we identify the conditions under which parties would prefer
high-low agreements. Section 3 describes our insurance litigation data. Section
4 examines whether the patterns in high-low discussions and agreements in our
data are consistent with our model’s predictions. Section 5 extends our model
by showing that litigants can also use high-low agreements to prevent the ex-
cessive rent seeking that can occur when litigation costs are endogenous and
offsetting in their effects on expected trial outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
Two litigants, a plaintiff and a defendant, engage in settlement negotiations
prior to a risky civil trial. If negotiations fail, the case proceeds to trial, where
the court enters a judgment for either high damages, xH, or low damages, xL,
where . The plaintiff and defendant assess the probability of an awardx 1 xH L
of high damages before settlement negotiations. The plaintiff believes that this
probability is , while the defendant believes that it is . Thesep  [0, 1] p  [0, 1]p d
beliefs are subjective and may diverge from one another. When thep 1 pp d
litigants are mutually optimistic about their lawsuit, and when the lit-p ! pp d
igants are mutually pessimistic. The plaintiff’s and defendant’s preferences are
represented by constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) expected utility functions
and , where ap and ad are the co-u (x)p exp (a x) u (x)p exp (a x)p p d d
efficients of absolute risk aversion,14 although all results continue to hold when
one of the litigants (for example, the defendant) is risk neutral.15 The litigation
costs of the plaintiff and defendant are cp and cd, respectively. The damages,
beliefs, preferences, and costs are all assumed to be common knowledge.
Contracts signed before trial may take one of two forms. An ordinary settle-
ment contract is a simple transfer payment, s, from the defendant to the plaintiff.
13 Interest rate collars in loan agreements, in which the borrower’s interest rate is permitted to
float between a ceiling and a floor, provide another example. See Briys et al. (1991).
14 See Farmer and Pecorino (1994) and Heyes et al. (2004) for settlement models with risk-averse
parties. Constant absolute risk aversion functions, commonly used in finance and macroeconomics,
allow no income or wealth effects, generating straightforward comparative statics, as litigation costs
drop out when calculating the optimal agreement.
15 Large insurers are diversified across claims and may be considered risk neutral. Formally, this
is captured in the limit as ad approaches 0. Interestingly, one can view the provision of high-low
contracts to plaintiffs as a natural extension of their core business of providing insurance to others.
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By agreeing to settle, litigants can avoid both the risk and costs of trial.16 Al-
ternatively, litigants may negotiate an award-modification contract that specifies
two payments, sH and sL. In particular, when the court awards high damages,
the defendant agrees to pay sH under the contract to the plaintiff instead of xH.
Similarly, when the court awards low damages, the defendant agrees to pay sL
to the plaintiff instead of xL. Negotiating award-modification contracts may be
costly: in addition to bearing the litigation costs at trial, cp and cd, the parties
incur costs kp and kd when they negotiate an award-modification contract.
A Pareto-optimal award-modification contract would satisfy
′ ′(p )u (s  c  k ) (p )u (s  c  k )p p H p p d d H d dp . (1)′ ′(1 p )u (s  c  k ) (1 p )u (s  c  k )p p L p p d d L d d
Equation (1) defines a locus of points, (sH, sL), where the litigants’ indifference
curves are tangent to each other.17 Note that if , then Pareto optimalityp p pp d
implies . When the litigants have the same beliefs, it is jointly optimals p sH L
for them to insure each other fully against the risk at trial. Lemma 1 characterizes
the set of Pareto-optimal modification contracts when litigants have potentially
different beliefs (see Appendix B for a proof).
Lemma 1. With CARA expected utility, the set of unconstrained Pareto-
optimal award-modification contracts satisfy , wheres  s p D*H L
1 (1/p ) 1d
D*p ln . (2)( ) [ ]a  a (1/p ) 1p d p
The implications of equation (2) are intuitive. When litigants are very risk
averse, meaning is large, then sL and sH will be close together, whicha  ap d
reflects the strong desire for insurance by the parties. Conversely, when litigants
are not very averse to risk, so is small, then sL and sH will be far apart.a  ap d
Equation (2) also implies that when litigants are mutually optimistic (p 1p
), they have an incentive to speculate or gamble on the outcome at trial bypd
increasing the stakes at the margin: the plaintiff receives a higher contractual
payout when actual damages are found to be high instead of low ( ).s  s 1 0H L
When litigants are mutually pessimistic ( ), this ordering is reversed: thep ! pp d
contract specifies a higher payout to the plaintiff when the court finds that
16 Note that if litigants have the same subjective assessment of the probability that the plaintiff
will win, then they would be jointly better off settling out of court for the expected damages, sp
. If the parties are both sufficiently optimistic about their own cases, so pp is sig-px  (1 p)xH L
nificantly higher than pd, then there may be no ordinary settlement contract, s, that makes both the
plaintiff and the defendant better off.
17 Given their (possibly divergent) beliefs, neither litigant could be made subjectively better off
without making the other litigant subjectively worse off. Equation (1) results if the plaintiff has the
bargaining power and chooses sH and sL to maximize ,p u (s  c  k ) (1 p )u (s  c  k )p p H p p p p L p p
subject to pdud(sH cd kd) (1 pd)ud(sL cd kd) ≥ pdud(xH cd kd) (1 pd)ud(xL
 cd  kd). It would also be obtained if the defendant has the bargaining power and chooses the
terms to maximize his expected utility subject to the plaintiff’s individual rationality constraint.
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damages are low and a lower payout when actual damages are found to be high
( ).18 Contracts with might lead litigants to sabotage theirs  s ! 0 s  s ! 0H L H L
own cases, however, and may therefore be unwise in practice.
In order to focus attention on realistic award-modification contracts, we im-
pose the following contractual restriction:
Assumption 1. We assume .x ≤ s ≤ s ≤ xL L H H
This assumption allows for many contracts that we observe in practice. It
permits ordinary settlement agreements where ; high-low agreements ins p sL H
which the defendant agrees to a higher award in the low state, , if thes 1 xL L
plaintiff agrees to a lower award in the high state, ; and no agreements ! xH H
at all, in which and . This assumption does rule out contractss p x s p xL L H H
in which , however, because such contracts would distort incentives, en-s 1 sL H
couraging litigants to sabotage their own cases. Assumption 1 also eliminates
contracts that amplify trial risk by making the high outcome, sH, even higher
than the actual damages in the high state, xH, or by making sL lower than the
low-state damages, xL.
19
We now characterize the litigants’ jointly optimal decision to settle out of
court or proceed to trial, either with a high-low contract (that specifies how any
damages award would be modified) in place or without any contract at all. In
the proposition, the function , which is defined and described inf(x  x )H L
Appendix B, captures the joint benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant from
trial without an award-modification contract.20
Proposition 1. If the litigants are mutually pessimistic, , then theyp ≤ pp d
settle out of court for a fixed amount. If the litigants are mutually optimistic,
, then a trial may occur.p 1 pp d
a) If , where is defined by ,˜ ˜ ˜x  x ≤ D D 1 D* f(D)p f(D*) (k  k )H L p d
then the litigants proceed to trial without any modification of the court’s award
when and settle out of court for a fixed amount otherwise.c  c ≤ f(x  x )p d H L
18 In the extreme case of and , the plaintiff and defendant would blissfully agreep p 0 p p 1p d
to a contract that had and .s p s p  L H
19 Optimistic, risk-neutral litigants would certainly want to amplify risk—indeed, they would want
to spread the awards as far apart as possible. Some degree of amplification would be jointly desirable
even for risk-averse parties when a plaintiff believes that it is much more likely that the court will
award high damages than a defendant does. Imagine an extreme case in which both parties believe
with certainty that they will prevail and so sign a contract with and . Thes p 0 ! x s p 2x 1 xL L H H H
defendant pays 0 in expectation, and the plaintiff expects twice as much as she would have otherwise
received. Indeed, with these extreme beliefs and absent liquidity constraints, the litigants would agree
to and . Such contracts might violate antigambling statutes or face other legal barrierss p – s p L H
when attempts at enforcement are made, but betting on lawsuit outcomes is not purely hypothetical.
Jolly (1928) describes how the taxation of such wagers was a source of revenue for the judiciary
under ancient Hindu law. See Donohue (1991) for a discussion of these issues in the context of
contracting over the allocation of legal fees.
20 This function takes on a value of 0 when and reaches its maximum value f(D*)x  x p 0H L
when xH  xL p D* as defined in lemma 1. The parties prefer a costly trial to any out-of-court
settlement when .c  c ≤ f(x  x )p d H L
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Figure 1. Theoretical predictions
b) If , then the litigants proceed to trial with a high-low contract˜x  x 1 DH L
specifying when and settle out of courts  s p D* c  c  k  k ≤ f (D*)H L p d p d
for a fixed amount otherwise.
Assumption 1 prevents mutually pessimistic litigants (those with ) fromp ! pp d
“shorting their own stock” with contracts with , so mutually pessimistics ! sH L
litigants will never go to trial. These cases will simply settle out of court. If the
litigants are mutually optimistic, however, some sort of trial may occur. In
proposition 1a, the risk associated with a naked trial, , is relatively small,x  xH L
and so the optimistic litigants gladly bear the full risk associated with a naked
trial when the total litigation costs, , are smaller than the joint gross benefitc  cp d
from naked litigation, ).21 In proposition 1b, where the risk associatedf(x  xH L
with a naked trial, , is large, the litigants choose to limit this risk throughx  xH L
a high-low contract with . The mutually optimistic litigants proceeds  s p D*H L
to trial when their joint transaction costs, , are smaller thanc  c  k  kp d p d
the joint gross benefit from going to trial with an optimal high-low contract,
f(D*).22
Figure 1 depicts the results of proposition 1 when litigants are mutually op-
timistic, .23 Cases settle out of court when the litigation costs, , arep 1 p c  cp d p d
21 Assumption 1 prevents these litigants from amplifying the risk at trial.
22 If , then this condition is not satisfied for any and and so litigants willk  k 1 f(D*) c cp d p d
refuse to enter into high-low contracts.
23 When , the litigants’ joint benefit of a naked trial is 0, . As the spreadx  x p 0 f (0)p 0H L
increases, naked trials become more risky for both litigants, creating both benefits andx  xH L
additional costs for them. The larger spread is jointly beneficial ex ante because the parties are
mutually optimistic and so there are mutual gains from trade from speculating at trial. At the same
time, the litigants are made relatively worse off by the increased risk premium, which augments the
direct costs of litigation. When is close to 0 and rising, the benefit of speculation initiallyx  xH L
grows faster than the risk premium (it is second order), so is increasing. Whenf(x  x ) x H L H
reaches D*, the risk premium is rising faster than the benefit from speculating at trial, soxL
is decreasing.f(x  x )H L
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large but proceed to trial when the litigation costs are small. Holding the litigation
costs fixed, one can see that naked trials arise in an intermediate range where
the spread is neither too high nor too low. When the spreadx  x x  xH L H L
exceeds a threshold , then parties proceed to trial with a high-low˜x  x 1 DH L
agreement.24 The next result follows immediately from proposition 1 and from
the properties of the function ).f(x  xH L
Proposition 2. When rises, the likelihood of the parties agreeing toc  cp d
an out-of-court settlement increases and the likelihood of a trial (with or without
a high-low agreement) falls. When rises, (a) the likelihood of settlementx  xH L
falls when is small and rises when is large, (b) the likelihoodx  x x  xH L H L
of a trial without a high-low agreement rises when is small and fallsx  xH L
when is large, and (c) the likelihood of a high-low agreement increases.x  xH L
3. Data Description
The empirical study of settlement behavior is challenging because many pa-
rameters of interest (notably, appetites for risk and subjective beliefs) are unob-
servable; parties are small (making data collection difficult) or unwilling to share
litigation-related information; and even when a public entity collects data on
final outcomes, facts about underlying settlement negotiations and features of
any agreement are rarely accessible. Our data, by contrast, consist of extensive
proprietary information about all claims made to a large national auto and
general liability insurer that closed between January 1, 2004, and March 31, 2009,
beginning with the specifics of the underlying loss event, ending with the final
resolution of the claim, and including comprehensive details about all disputes
and any litigation.25
We extracted our data on high-low discussions and agreements from detailed
narrative records that the insurer maintains (entered by both claim handlers and
lawyers) on its management and resolution of each claim in dispute.26 Using a
text-mining algorithm, we were able to identify claims that involved, at least on
the insurer’s side, some consideration of a high-low arrangement—including
negotiations over high-low terms and even instances in which the insurer con-
sidered but decided against making a high-low proposal.27 For each of these
claims, we recorded the context of the high-low conversation or deliberation,
24 When xH  xL p D*, a high-low agreement provides no advantage over a naked trial since the
trial outcome itself is Pareto optimal. When , the trial outcome is not Pareto˜x  x  (D*, D)H L
optimal, but the additional costs of drafting the high-low agreement outweigh its benefits.
25 The insurer insisted on anonymity as a condition of allowing us to use its data.
26 Unfortunately, the insurer does not maintain electronic copies of its settlement or high-low
agreements, nor any information about whether any high-low agreement was a written or oral
contract. We obtained example copies of a number of the insurer’s high-low agreements, redacted
versions of which are available on request.
27 See Appendix A for a description of the search algorithm, the information that we collected,
the coding process that we employed, and the procedures that we used to ensure accuracy.
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 14 Jan 2015 10:39:44 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
708 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
whether the parties reached an agreement, the number of back-and-forth pro-
posals, the relevant dates, and the proximity of the discussion to trial or arbi-
tration, if apparent. In the event of an actual agreement, we recorded the high
and low terms.
In these insurance cases, plaintiffs allege that injurers caused harm covered
by the insurer’s policies. If the plaintiff asserts damages within policy limits or
declines to pursue the insured individually for any excess, the insurer effectively
replaces the injurer as the defendant. Table 1 presents summary statistics for
disputed claims with known resolutions, broken down by whether or not a claim
involved high-low activity.28 As a group, the 935 cases involving high-low dis-
cussions and agreements took longer to conclude, ended with larger payouts,
generated higher litigation costs for the insurer, and were less likely to involve
a fatality or a corporate claimant than an average disputed claim, whether settled
or litigated.29 Table 2 breaks down claims involving high-low activity into those
involving just discussions and those involving actual agreements and, further,
by how those claims were ultimately resolved (settlement or trial/arbitration).
Of the 246 claims with high-low agreements, 99 were resolved at trial or in
arbitration (an overall litigation rate of 40 percent). (There are five fewer claims
in this table than in Table 1 because the final resolutions of five claims with
high-low discussions are unknown.)
Table 3 reports claim, contract, and resolution details for the 246 claims in
which the parties agreed to a high-low contract, including those that were sub-
sequently settled out of court. Highs and lows average close to $161,000 and
$44,000, respectively, and parties typically finalized their high-low agreements
in the latter stages of these disputes. Although high-low agreements are clearly
drafted in anticipation of trial or arbitration (indeed, as reflected in Table 2,
approximately 100 of them went to a fact finder), litigants actually settled a
majority of cases carrying high-low agreements prior to any adjudicated reso-
lution. Finally, although our data include only limited information on the actual
damages awarded by a fact finder, we do observe every insurer’s payout. Most
payments in the adjudicated high-low cases—68 percent—fell between the upper
28 Of the approximately 45,000 claims that were resolved without high-low activity, almost 2,500
claims (or about 5 percent) went to trial or arbitration. This class of litigated cases was more likely
to include general liability claims, involved more corporate claimants, resulted in lower ultimate
payouts, and involved higher litigation costs for the insurer when compared with the claims that
settled without high-low activity. Table A1 provides additional information for all litigated claims
( ), for all claims involving a high-low discussion ( ), and for all claims involvingnp 2,636 np 935
a high-low agreement ( ). These groups overlap with each other.np 246
29 The relationship of the alleged harm to the policy limit can influence high-low discussions
because a judgment that exceeds the policy limit places the policyholder at risk for the excess. However,
insurers that refuse to settle for the policy limit typically pay any excess rather than risk liability for
exercising bad faith in rejecting such an offer. See State Farm Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003).
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Table 1
Summary Statistics by Final Resolution and High-Low Activity for All Claims in Dispute
Claims without High-Low
Discussions or Agreements
Resolved by
Settlement or
Mediation
Resolved by
Trial or
Arbitration
Claims with
High-Low Discussions
and Agreements
N 42,863 2,492 935
Claims by year closed:
2004 4,821 297 138
2005 7,170 432 150
2006 8,553 529 180
2007 9,676 537 206
2008 11,036 576 230
2009 1,607 121 31
Type of claim:
Auto liability 23,435 882 590
General liability 19,428 1,610 345
Region where claim arose (%):
Northeast 31.95 39.85 68.02
South 30.28 26.81 13.90
Midwest 11.93 8.83 6.84
West 25.50 23.96 10.91
Pacific .27 .52 .32
Claimant characteristics:
Claimant type (%):
Firm or business 6.8 10.7 1.5
Individual 89.8 86.2 92.1
Unknown 3.4 3.1 6.4
Part of body injured (%):
Fatality 2.6 2.2 1.6
Head 6.8 5.9 8.5
Lower extremities 11.4 12.8 14.2
Multiple injuries 1.9 3.3 1.1
Neck 14.9 13.2 9.4
Spinal 6.4 4.0 10.6
Trunk 29.6 23.5 38.3
Upper extremities 9.4 7.9 12.7
Personal injury 4.4 5.0 1.1
Unreported 12.8 22.2 2.6
Average claim characteristics:
Duration of claim (months) 26.10
(15.61)
27.63
(18.66)
37.28
(18.49)
Initial reserve ($) 7,355
(16,228)
7,043
(13,603)
7,055
(12,425)
Loss paid ($) 41,508
(109,358)
28,153
(117,658)
93,426
(174,682)
Insurer litigation costs ($) 7,765
(20,578)
13,231
(32,865)
14,215
(31,792)
Policy limit, per person ($) 798,397
(894,999)
1,003,179
(887,140)
632,594
(740,183)
Policy limit, per event ($) 1,059,359
(1,252,906)
1,423,470
(2,447,770)
878,318
(801,791)
Note. Values are computed from machine data or litigation notes provided by the insurer. Financial values
are reported in 2008 dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics by Final Resolution for All Claims with High-Low Discussions
Discussions Only Agreements
Settlement or
Mediation
(1)
Trial or
Arbitration
(2)
Settlement or
Mediation
(3)
Trial or
Arbitration
(4)
N 639 45 147 99
Claims by year closed:
2004 104 4 16 11
2005 111 11 21 7
2006 115 12 36 17
2007 133 5 36 32
2008 157 10 32 29
2009 19 3 6 3
Type of claim:
Auto liability 400 23 87 78
General liability 239 22 60 21
Region where claim arose (%):
Northeast 68.23 60.00 72.11 63.64
South 12.99 15.56 14.97 17.17
Midwest 7.20 6.67 2.72 11.11
West 11.42 15.56 10.20 7.07
Pacific .16 2.22 .00 1.01
Claimant characteristics:
Claimant type (%):
Firm or business 1.3 .0 3.4 1.0
Individual 93.3 84.4 91.8 89.9
Unknown 5.5 15.6 4.8 9.1
Part of body injured (%):
Fatality 1.7 6.7 .7 .0
Head 8.9 4.4 9.5 5.1
Lower extremities 13.3 20.0 17.0 13.1
Multiple injuries .9 6.7 .7 .0
Neck 9.7 8.9 8.8 9.1
Spinal 10.2 11.1 11.6 11.1
Trunk 39.1 31.1 36.1 41.4
Upper extremities 13.2 8.9 11.6 14.1
Personal Injury .8 .0 2.0 1.0
Unreported 2.2 2.2 2.0 5.1
Average claim characteristics:
Duration of claim (months) 35.57
(18.13)
50.47
(27.42)
39.60
(17.13)
39.17
(13.64)
Initial reserve ($) 7,318
(13,084)
10,945
(18,015)
6,501
(10,805)
4,468
(4,531)
Loss paid ($) 92,201
(170,228)
150,415
(337,284)
89,140
(141,065)
85,980
(139,191)
Insurer litigation costs ($) 11,943
(26,340)
56,349
(84,126)
13,846
(25,296)
10,904
(10,792)
Policy limit per person ($) 664,752
(792,354)
643,792
(545,772)
627,319
(664,195)
416,004
(509,241)
Policy limit per event ($) 889,047
(796,347)
1,129,779
(879,138)
936,635
(862,668)
588,551
(624,862)
Note. Values are computed from machine data or litigation notes provided by the insurer. Financial values
are reported in 2008 dollars. All claims involved a high-low discussion and are broken down by the claim’s
final high-low status and how the claim was ultimately resolved. Any high-low agreement is, by definition,
no longer in force if the parties decide to renegotiate and fully settle. To be conservative, we assume that
dozens of cases that involve high-low agreements settle when the insurer reports only that mediation or
negotiation occurred (even though both can lead to some form of binding adjudication). Standard deviations
are in parentheses.
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Table 3
Details of High-Low Agreements
Value
Total number of high-low agreements (complete) 246
Average duration from report date:
High-low agreement reached (months) 31.91
(14.8)
Claim closed (months) 39.43
(15.8)
High-low agreement details ($):
Average high amount 161,111
(223,198)
Average low amount 43,912
(107,645)
Resolution of high-low claims (%):
Arbitration 28.1
Litigation 12.2
Settlement 56.9
Mediation 2.9
Payout when claim adjudicated under high-low agreement (%):
Final payout at the low end 15.2
Final payout between the high and low ends 67.7
Final payout at the high end 15.2
Unknown (%) 2.0
Note. Values are computed from machine data or litigation notes provided by the insurer.
Financial values are reported in 2008 dollars. For 2% of the claims, high-low terms or payout
information is missing, leaving the payout amount’s relationship to the high and low terms
unknown. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
and lower bounds, but payouts at the low and at the high ends in both cases
happened in 15 percent of the claims.30
Table 4 displays information about the 935 claims in which the parties at a
minimum discussed the possibility of entering into a high-low agreement.31
Unconditional averages across three types of these cases—claims in which the
possibility of a high-low agreement was raised by one party, claims in which a
high-low agreement was seriously discussed by both parties, and claims in which
a high-low agreement was formally executed—reveal no particularly unusual
differences or patterns, which suggests that, although claims that are candidates
for high-low agreements may differ significantly from a typical claim in dispute,
the line that separates claims in which a high-low agreement is simply suggested
by a party from claims in which such a contract is signed may turn on chance
circumstances.
30 The coincidence that the proportion of cases paying out at the high end equals the proportion
paying out at the low end does not imply that litigants are somehow equal in bargaining power,
equally able to predict extreme outcomes, or even behaving rationally. Damages are bounded below
(by 0), so an insurer’s gains from a single binding high term might easily exceed the cost of paying
out on dozens of binding low terms.
31 The insurer at least internally discussed offering high-low terms in more than 300 additional
claims (we found no evidence that any discussions with plaintiffs occurred in these cases).
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Table 4
Summary Statistics by Intensity of High-Low Discussion
High-Low Raised
by One Party
Parties Amenable
to High-Low
High-Low Agreement
Reached
N 345 344 246
Claims by year closed:
2004 59 52 27
2005 66 56 28
2006 70 57 53
2007 59 79 68
2008 82 87 61
2009 9 13 9
Type of claim:
Auto liability 224 201 165
General liability 121 143 81
Region where claim arose (%):
Northeast 70.43 65.12 68.70
South 12.75 13.66 15.85
Midwest 5.80 8.43 6.10
West 10.72 12.50 8.94
Pacific .29 .29 .41
Claimant characteristics:
Claimant type (%):
Firm or business 1.5 .9 2.4
Individual 91.0 93.9 91.1
Unknown 7.5 5.2 6.5
Part of body injured (%):
Fatality 1.7 2.3 .4
Head 8.1 9.3 7.7
Lower extremities 12.8 14.8 15.5
Multiple injuries .6 2.0 .4
Neck 9.6 9.6 8.9
Spinal 8.1 12.5 11.4
Trunk 44.6 32.0 38.2
Upper extremities 12.8 12.8 12.6
Personal injury .3 1.5 1.6
Unreported 1.5 3.2 3.3
Average claim characteristics:
Duration of claim (months) 35.36
(20.77)
37.68
(17.69)
39.43
(15.79)
Initial reserve ($) 7,307
(14,351)
7,785
(12,475)
5,683
(8,876)
Loss paid ($) 78,472
(147,138)
112,377
(216,173)
87,876
(140,041)
Insurer litigation costs ($) 13,420
(37,407)
16,123
(32,183)
12,662
(20,736)
Policy limit per person ($) 606,609
(618,820)
723,243
(907,452)
542,277
(614,334)
Policy limit per event ($) 860,351
(788,358)
951,524
(816,792)
795,281
(791,954)
Note. Values are computed from machine data or litigation notes provided by the insurer. Financial values
are reported in 2008 dollars. Claims with a high-low agreement raised by one party include claims in which
either the insurer or the other party raised the possibility of a high-low agreement in a settlement discussion
but the other side was uninterested, according to the litigation notes. Claims with parties amenable to a
high-low agreement include claims in which the parties attempted to negotiate a high-low agreement at
some point in the litigation. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 14 Jan 2015 10:39:44 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
High-Low Agreements 713
4. Empirical Strategy and Results
We do not observe litigants’ beliefs about likely damages awards, and we cannot
directly measure their levels of risk aversion. As a result, we are unable to test
the validity of our model directly. Comparative statics derived from the theoretical
analysis in Section 2, however, demonstrate that if our theoretical account is
valid, we may be able to detect its influence on settlement behavior. Consequently,
our empirical strategy employs two of our model’s conjectures about litigants’
behavior under varying exogenous conditions to predict a particular pattern in
how parties approach and resolve claims.32
First, our model suggests that when expected litigation costs are high, we
should observe more settlement and fewer trials, including fewer high-low agree-
ments, all else equal. Therefore, if the insurer’s expected costs, cd, are high and
cd and cp are not too negatively correlated,
33 we should witness fewer trials.
Second, when adjudication outcomes are sufficiently unpredictable (or the var-
iance in the award or payout amount is high because its distribution has a larger
spread—that is, is sufficiently large), we should see litigants considering,x  xH L
discussing, and entering into high-low agreements more often.34
Combining these two predictions, we can rank four categories of cases in
terms of how likely they are to involve high-low discussions and agreements,
from most likely to least likely: (1) cases with low expected litigation costs and
high expected outcome variance (LC-HV), (2) cases with low expected litigation
costs and low expected outcome variance (LC-LV) or with high expected litigation
costs and high expected outcome variance (HC-HV),35 and finally (3) cases with
high expected litigation costs and low expected outcome variance (HC-LV). In
what follows, we examine whether behavior is consistent with this ranking by
empirically evaluating the relative likelihood that parties will prefer high-low
agreements to settlement or naked adjudication.
In carrying out this empirical work, we construct a proxy for expected litigation
costs for each dispute using the actual litigation costs of cases with similar
32 Demonstrating a causal relationship—that parties use high-low agreements to reduce risk-
associated losses—requires more than a pattern in the data that is consistent with the model. We
must also rule out all reasonable alternative explanations for the pattern. Although we are not aware
of any obvious alternative explanations for what we find, our empirical claimmust remain descriptive
in nature.
33 The condition is sufficient and requires simply that litigation costs be weakCorr(c , c ) ≥ 0d p
complements, which is surely true in the vast majority of cases. Ideally, we would include expected
in our analysis, but we have data only from a single, repeat defendant.cp
34 In a general model, risk-averse parties would attempt to reduce risk when damages become
more variable, through either settlement or the use of high-low agreements. But, in the context of
our model, an increase in can either increase, decrease, or not affect the likelihood ofx  xH L
settlement, depending on the level of . The line divides those cases that are˜x  x x  x p DH L H L
optimally resolved (from the perspective of the parties) with a naked trial from those that are optimally
resolved using a high-low agreement.
35 The rank ordering of LC-LV and HC-HV is theoretically ambiguous, depending on the level of
risk aversion of one or both parties and therefore the rate of exchange between risk and costs for
each party.
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exogenous characteristics. Our reliance on defendants’ cost data to study settle-
ment behavior is not a major limitation. Opposing parties’ litigation costs are
highly correlated because they are complementary (for example, Shepherd 1999);36
moreover, our approach depends only on ordinal comparisons and not on ab-
solute cost levels. We approximate outcome variance for each claim using the
exogenous variation over time in the claim’s reserve. The construction of these
variables is described and defended in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. The central intuition
behind this measurement approach is that settlement behavior is rooted in the
parties’ beliefs about the likely consequences of available choices (in particular,
litigation costs and outcome variability); that litigants (typically represented by
legal counsel with insurance litigation experience) form these expectations from
the trial, arbitration, and settlement of prior disputes involving similar claims;
and that, therefore, outcomes in other cases with similar characteristics can serve
as proxies for these beliefs.37
4.1. Measuring Expected Litigation Costs
When deciding whether to propose or accept a settlement or high-low offer,
a litigant must consider the likely costs of continued litigation. Although we
have multiple claim-level measures of monthly litigation expenditures (including
fees paid to outside counsel, internal transfers to the insurer’s legal department,
and fees paid to courts), we cannot use actual costs as a measure of expected
costs because a claim’s actual costs and how parties resolve that claim are jointly
determined.38 Indeed, litigants choose whether to settle and how to manage their
cases in part to avoid costs they would otherwise incur.
To estimate each claim’s expected total litigation costs, therefore, we make use
of the relationship between the costs of fully litigated claims (that is, those
resolved through arbitration or trial) and the exogenous characteristics of those
claims. We begin by estimating , where Ci represents the insurer’sC p bX  i i i
total actual litigation costs for a fully adjudicated claim i (involving no high-
low activity) and Xi is a comprehensive set of exogenous characteristics about
the dispute, including insured and claimant details, the injury or damage sus-
36 Certainly the litigation costs of opposing sides will diverge over short periods of time, especially
in the context of an insurer defendant (with staff attorneys and other fixed costs) and an individual
plaintiff represented by a sole practitioner. Still, using as a proxy for makes sense becausec c  cd p d
we are concerned only with total (not monthly) expected litigation costs per claim.
37 We implicitly investigate this assumption in our work by checking to see whether litigants behave
in ways that are consistent with their being rational and informed about their own case and prior
similar cases.
38 For example, if claims that settle tend to settle early, costs will be negatively correlated with
settlement, and a regression of resolution outcomes on costs would suggest that lawyers and their
clients prefer to litigate expensive cases when a more likely explanation is that settlement dramatically
reduces overall litigation costs.
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tained, the insurance policy, the location of the suit, and so on.39 We exclude
any characteristic (for example, the duration of the case) that litigants might
manipulate to lower their costs (including attempts to improve settlement pros-
pects) or to raise their opponents’ costs (see Gruber and Yelowitz 1999). We
then take these estimated coefficients and the values of the exogenous variables
for every claim in dispute and use them to generate a predicted cost for each
claim had it been resolved through naked trial or arbitration.40 We view this
measure as appropriate because we focus on a litigant’s desire to avoid the costs
of a naked trial or arbitration that would otherwise occur by default.41
Building our expected litigation costs measure using only fully litigated claims
(that is, those without high-low activity) may introduce sample selection bias
into our cost estimates—by assumption, cases that proceed all the way to trial
or arbitration are likely to be less costly, all else equal. Fortunately, this step of
our empirical strategy relies only on the ordinal rank of cases and case char-
acteristics in terms of their relationship to actual litigation expenses. More pre-
cisely, we assume that the exogenous characteristics that make fully litigated cases
more expensive also make settled cases more costly.42 Given that we rely only
on preexisting claim attributes to estimate expected costs and that significant
expenditures occur before settlement, we view this assumption as reasonable.
Nevertheless, we produced alternative expected cost measures using all claims
in dispute to estimate b regardless of how they were resolved. This approach is
less attractive, as we explain in Section 4.5, but, in any event, both measures
lead to similar results.43
39 More specifically, we include different subsets (four in total) of the following: a presuit estimation
of liability by the insurer, the year in which the loss was reported, the year in which the lawsuit was
filed, the number of individuals injured in the loss event, the types of injuries and/or losses, whether
a fatality occurred, whether the claim was in the auto or general liability line of business, the state
and region of the accident, the state in which the litigation occurred, the policy limit, the population
density where the insured lived and where the claimant lived, the early estimates (in months 2, 3,
and 4) by the insurer of its incurred losses or reserve amount on the claim, demographic data for
the area in which the insured lived, and the type of claimant (individual or company).
40 We use four sets of exogenous characteristics to model the actual litigation costs of fully litigated
claims (see Table 5 for a description of the sets). The associated R2 statistics (adjusting for lost degrees
of freedom) range from .18 (set 1) to over .20 (set 4) as additional covariates are included.
41 We also considered using “jackknife” estimates of in which we would run a separate regressionb
on all adjudicated observations except one (claim ) to estimate and then use to predictˆi b b G ii i
so that the actual costs of claim i play no role in our estimate of expected costs. We found,ˆCi
however, that our expected cost regression replications occasionally dropped different variables as
collinear, making jackknifing impossible without eliminating some exogenous regressors. We decided
against this approach. Our cost regressions involve thousands of observations, and therefore any
single claim has very little influence on our estimates of .b
42 For example, if litigation is more expensive in a particular state, we assume that settling in that
state is at least not less expensive than it would be in other states. Likewise, if litigating a head injury
case is more costly than litigating a leg injury case, we assume that settling a head injury case will,
on average, entail higher costs than settling a leg injury case.
43 One way to address the selection problem directly is to identify an exogenous cost shifter—
some characteristic that makes certain claims more or less expensive to litigate, regardless of the
stage at which the claims are resolved—and employ an instrumental variables (IV) framework. We
explored many candidate instruments, including federal civil and criminal case loads and durations,
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4.2. Measuring Expected Outcome Variance
A litigant deciding whether to offer or accept high-low or out-of-court set-
tlement terms must also determine whether the case is sufficiently risky or
unpredictable, all else equal, to make the terms under consideration worthwhile.
Certain types of claims are more likely (and are known to be more likely) than
others to evolve at irregular times and in unpredictable ways. In particular, for
each category of disputed claim, it may be more or less common for new in-
formation about the claim, the evidence relating to the claim, the opposing party,
or the opposing party’s strategy to emerge in ways that significantly alter the
litigation landscape and therefore the likely outcome of any adjudication.44
Our data include each claim’s monthly reserve amount (or incurred loss)—
the then-current, but conservative, best guess of the claim’s litigation value. The
reserve is a claim-specific amount that an insurer allocates to cover its potential
obligations under an insurance contract.45 All insurers are required by state law
to set reserve amounts.46 In theory, when setting the reserve, the insurer balances
legal and economic factors: ensuring sufficient liquidity to cover any required
payout on a claim while at the same time not forgoing more profitable invest-
ments for its capital any more than is necessary.47 Importantly, the insurer that
made its data available to us reports that it evaluates its claim handlers’ abilities
in part by the accuracy of their reserve determinations.
Over the course of any dispute, the insurer adjusts the reserve amount over
time to account for new information about the underlying loss event or the
litigation. A claim’s reserve amount can change dramatically month to month
as newly relevant information comes to light. We use the variance of the reserve
state civil and criminal per capita case loads, state-specific cost averages, state fixed effects, and an
indicator for whether the case was being litigated in a state other than the one in which the loss
occurred, but our first-stage results were too weak to pursue an IV strategy. Variation in litigation
expenses appears to be driven much more by claimant-, insured-, or claim-specific differences than
by exogenous cost shocks or shifters such as a change in state law or statewide patterns.
44 For example, in the context of our model, if is large, then even small changes in p (thex  xH L
likelihood that the plaintiff prevails in court) could lead to large changes in the expected payout.
45 Grace (1990) finds evidence that deviations between the reserves and future losses are not random
and may be a mechanism for smoothing income. Other work shows that financially secure insurers
tend to be more conservative in setting reserves than their less-secure counterparts (Petroni 1992;
Gaver and Paterson 2007; Petroni et al. 2000). These papers do not look at claim-level reserves, as
we do here, however. Black et al. (2008) detect no relationship between defense costs and reserves
in claim-level medical malpractice data, which leads the authors to question insurers’ rationality,
despite finding such a relationship in other claim types.
46 “All states impose reserve requirements on insurers to provide protection to policyholders,
assuring that assets will be available to pay claims” (McGuire 1996, p. 38). Salzmann (1984) discusses
common methods for estimating reserves.
47 Because a reserve is an estimate of a filed claim’s likely value and is determined internally for
record keeping and regulatory compliance, there is no strategic reason—at least with respect to any
individual claim—for the insurer or its employees to manipulate the valuation process. We asked
the insurer’s officers whether there was a more precise meaning to the best-guess description and
learned only that the reserve is the expected value, viewed conservatively. We interpret this to mean
that the reserve is set at some point between the 50th and 60th percentile of the insurer’s estimated
distribution of likely damages.
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amount over the course of the claim’s life, conditional on the claim’s duration,
as a proxy for expected claim volatility.48 In adopting this strategy, we continue
to assume that litigants are knowledgeable about their own cases and other cases
with similar characteristics and are therefore able to use exogenous case char-
acteristics to ascertain the likely variance of a claim’s monthly reserve.49
Finally, we note that, although variance in the reserve amount can account
for riskiness because of unanticipated information shocks during litigation, our
measure does not proxy for any predictable randomness in judge or jury ver-
dicts.50 Even a case that is expected to develop predictably between when a claim
is filed and when the presentation of evidence ends and the fact finder’s delib-
erations begin—that is, a claim that in theory should have predictably stable
reserves throughout the course of litigation—may still be considered very risky
from beginning to end if the fact finder involved is known to behave unpre-
dictably when faced with the type of claim at issue. Because these two types of
uncertainty are likely to be independent of each other, however, and at a min-
imum because there is no reason to believe that they are negatively correlated,
failing to capture latent fact finder unpredictability is unlikely to confound our
empirical results.
4.3. Defining Claim Resolution Outcomes
The simple model presented in Section 2 implies a clear categorization of how
claims move toward resolution: parties either proceed directly to naked adju-
dication, agree to settle out of court, or enter into a high-low agreement before
they adjudicate their dispute. In reality, however, litigants may initiate negoti-
48 This measure also has a clear link to the value from our model. Suppose that a reservex  xH L
amount set aside for a claim at any point in time t is the estimated expected value of the claim if
the dispute is resolved by a court. Denote this reserve by . Suppose further that is certainR x  xt H L
and known to both parties and that rp (r1, r2,. . ., rT) is the time series representing the evolving
probability of high damages. Then, at time t the reserves are a linear function of given byR rt t
. Therefore, if V denotes the volatility of r, then the vol-R p r x  (1 r )x p x  r (x  x )t t H t L L t H L
atility of the time series of reserves is given by and the volatility of the reserves processV(x  x )H L
is a linear function of . Note that related measures of volatility are possible using the reservex  xH L
information, including the total number of changes to the reserve amount, the difference between
the first reserve amount and the last reserve amount, and so on.
49 We also constructed a number of candidate volatility instruments. For example, we considered
tort reforms designed to limit excessive verdicts (for example, laws that cap damages and joint-and-
several liability reforms), but the first stage was too weak. We also examined changes to offer-of-
judgment rules, because a law that shifts attorneys’ fees will increase outcome variance, but there
was too little within-state legal variation for this to be a productive strategy (only one or two states
made significant reforms during our sample period).
50 If reserves are truly set at the 55th or 60th percentile of a symmetric damages distribution (or,
really, anything strictly above the median), one could also measure a claim’s expected outcome
volatility by using a quantile regression framework and exogenous claim characteristics to estimate
the 90th and the 50th percentiles of the reserve amount distribution in, say, the fifth month of every
claim’s life. The larger the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile estimates, the greater the expected
outcome variance should be. One advantage of this approach is that claim types that have constant
reserves but are nevertheless risky because of fact finder unpredictability may have greater spreads
in their fifth-month reserves, all else equal. The same approach could be used to predict the spread
in the final loss paid amount, although this method may suffer from sample selection bias.
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ations or renegotiate their agreements at any time—for example, when new facts
about the litigation become apparent or litigants’ preferences or resources change.
In our data, for instance, litigants regularly revisit their high-low agreements,
often replacing them with out-of-court settlements and avoiding trial altogether.51
This potential for renegotiation of course complicates any attempt to categorize
claims by how they were resolved.52
In our empirical work, we categorize claims as involving a high-low discussion
or agreement if the parties ever enter into a high-low discussion or agreement
during the dispute—even if the claim in question is eventually resolved by out-
of-court settlement or naked adjudication. We take this approach because we
are fundamentally interested in the conditions that lead litigants to consider
entering into a high-low agreement, even one that may ultimately be renegotiated
and may therefore be temporary. After all, renegotiating from a high-low agree-
ment to full settlement would most likely occur as the result of a cost shock
that makes continuing the litigation too expensive,53 and once a high-low agree-
ment is in place, the game changes—both parties must agree to any superseding
contract.
The consideration, discussion, and negotiation of a potential high-low agree-
ment between the parties are each separately meaningful and important outcomes
in their own right. Discussions often do not graduate to agreements because of
transaction costs or chance factors, parties who discuss a high-low agreement
are more interested in such an arrangement than those who do not, and a high-
low discussion may proxy for an agreement that was not included in the litigation
notes we examined. High-low discussions also have the advantage of being far
more numerous than actual agreements, which allows for more reliable statistical
testing.54
51 Theoretically, if both litigants were to become more optimistic ex post, they might prefer to
unwind a settlement or void a high-low agreement and pursue a full-blown trial instead, but we see
no evidence of this behavior in our data, and it strikes us as likely to be extremely rare.
52 This two-stage settlement process (that is, first a high-low agreement, then full settlement) may
have a behavioral explanation as well. Instead of being a rational response to new information about
litigation costs, settlement might follow a high-low agreement because litigants bound by a high-
low agreement view their range of options differently than they did prior to concluding the high-
low arrangement, a change in perspective that the parties may not have anticipated. For example,
after agreeing to a high-low contract to guarantee a minimum recovery, a plaintiff may come to
believe that, given a huge damages award is no longer possible, full settlement is simplymore attractive
than she had predicted it would seem before she consented to the high-low agreement.
53 On the other hand, temporary high-low agreements may exist, for instance, because artificial
time constraints (imposed by settlement conferences, for example) make it impossible to negotiate
full settlements all at once. A high-low agreement may be easier to obtain (although our model
actually considers the opposite possibility explicitly—that high-low agreements may be relatively
costly to negotiate) and may be viewed optimistically as temporary but valuable protection against
extreme trial outcomes.
54 In unreported work, we also consider a narrower definition, defining a claim as involving high-
low activity only if the litigation was resolved at trial or in arbitration with that agreement still in
place.
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4.4. Predicting High-Low Discussions and Agreements
Our empirical strategy identifies the claim-specific factors associated with each
of three mutually exclusive claim resolution outcomes: naked trials or arbitra-
tions, high-low discussions or agreements, and out-of-court settlements. Because
these categories are not meaningfully ordered and because other assumptions
underlying the approach are likely to be satisfied, we adopt a multinomial logit
framework, which allows us to calculate the probability of a particular outcome
relative to a baseline category. More precisely, we estimate
′
ˆexp (x g )ij jp(y p j)p . (3)i ′
ˆ exp (x g )ik kk
The matrix xij denotes claim i’s characteristics, which are associated with each
of the J alternative dispute outcomes, and is the vector of estimatedgˆ K # 1
coefficients that characterizes the relationship between expected litigation costs
and expected payout variance to the claim resolution outcome. Because a full-
blown trial occurs absent some agreement, resolution through naked trial or
arbitration serves as our baseline category.55
To keep our analysis simple, we incorporate expected litigation costs and
expected volatility into our primary regressions as indicator variables (xij) that
we construct in the following way:56 Using all disputed claims, we calculate the
median expected litigation costs and the median expected outcome volatility.
We then categorize claims as above or below the median in each category. Finally,
we use the interactions of these two measures to define four groups: HC-HV,
LC-HV, HC-LV, and LC-LV. For the behavior in our data to be consistent with
our model’s predictions, claims with below-median expected litigation costs and
above-median outcome variance (LC-HV) should be relatively more likely to
involve a high-low discussion or agreement. Although parsimonious, our em-
pirical approach intuitively examines our theory and generates results that are
straightforward in their interpretation.
55 This modeling approach generated a host of thorny technical issues when we attempted to use
instrumental variables methods to remove any selection effects. Estimating a multinomial logit model
with endogenous regressors is, to say the least, nontrivial. We employed the control function approach
described in Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008), although this approach is not fully satisfactory. See
Imbens and Wooldridge (2007, p. 17): “Allowing endogenous explanatory variables [EEVs] in mul-
tinomial response models is notoriously difficult, even for continuous endogenous vari-
ables. . . . First, multinomial probit [MNP], which mixes well [with] a reduced form normality
assumption for D(y2Fz), is still computationally difficult for even a moderate number of choices.
Apparently, no one has undertaken a systematic treatment of MNPwith EEVs. . . . Themultinomial
logit [MNL] . . . is much simpler computationally with lots of alternatives. Unfortunately, the
normal distribution does not mix well with the extreme value distribution, and so, if we begin with
a structural MNL model . . . , the [control function approach’s] estimating equations are difficult
to obtain, and MLE is very difficult, too, even if we assume a normal distribution in the reduced
form[s].”
56 Our framework makes use of generated regressors, and, as a consequence, the usual approach
to calculating standard errors results in biased estimates (Murphy and Topel 1985). To remedy this
concern, we report standard errors calculated by bootstrapping.
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Table 5
Likelihood of High-Low Discussion or Agreement and Full Settlement
Relative to Trial or Arbitration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-low discussion:
HC-HV 4.255
(.736)
[.00]
4.140
(.725)
[.00]
4.657
(.964)
[.00]
5.293
(1.112)
[.00]
LC-HV 5.198
(1.180)
[.01]
5.712
(1.228)
[.00]
7.097
(1.689)
[.00]
8.486
(2.215)
[.01]
LC-LV 1.281
(.315)
[.39]
1.375
(.338)
[.29]
1.684
(.438)
[.15]
1.551
(.431)
[.23]
Settlement:
HC-HV 1.103
(.074)
[.19]
1.131
(.076)
[.11]
1.045
(.080)
[.59]
1.062
(.101)
[.55]
LC-HV 1.012
(.103)
[.91]
1.178
(.121)
[.17]
1.182
(.151)
[.26]
1.205
(.151)
[.20]
LC-LV .757
(.070)
[.01]
.862
(.081)
[.12]
.818
(.094)
[.08]
.804
(.096)
[.07]
Expected litigation costs:a
Set 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Set 2 Yes Yes Yes
Set 3 Yes Yes
Set 4 Yes
N 45,379 44,000 36,113 32,317
Note. Litigation costs are predicted using litigated cases. Estimates are reported as relative risk ratios. The
outcome variable captures whether a claim ever involved a high-low discussion or agreement and, if not,
whether it settled out of court or was resolved through trial or arbitration (excluded category). The
independent variables are indicators for the interaction between an indicator for whether the claim had
above- or below-median expected litigation costs and an indicator for whether the claim had above- or
below-median expected outcome variance. Therefore, HC-HV is one for claims with above-median (H)
expected litigation costs (C) and above-median (H) expected outcome variance (V) and zero otherwise,
and so on. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values are in brackets.
a Set 1 includes state of litigation fixed effects, accident region fixed effects, fixed effects for the insurance
company’s estimate of percentage of liability, year effects for when the accident was reported, fixed effects
for the number of persons injured in the event, fixed effects for type of injury or damage, a fatality indicator,
and an indicator for whether the line of business was automobile liability or general liability. Set 2 adds
state of accident fixed effects, the insurance policy claim limit, the population density of the insured’s
geographic area, and the insurance company’s estimates of incurred loss in months 3, 4, and 5 after the
filing of the claim. Set 3 adds variables about the area where the insured lives, the type of plaintiff (corporate
or individual), and the population density of the plaintiff’s geographic area. Set 4 adds an indicator for
the year in which the suit was filed.
4.5. Empirical Results
In Table 5, we present evidence that high-low discussions and agreements are
much more likely to occur when a claim’s expected litigation costs are relatively
low and its expected outcome volatility is relatively high, a finding consistent
with the predictions of our model. With HC-LV claims serving as our omitted
category, the top half of the table reports the relative difference in the likelihood
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that litigants engage in high-low discussions and agreements (versus adjudication
with no such discussion) between a case that has high costs and low volatility
and cases from the other three groups. To make the interpretation of these
estimates more concrete, the risk ratios for HC-HV claims, for example, imply
that moving from below-median variance to above-median variance when liti-
gation costs are expected to be high (in other words, replacing HC-LV claims
with HC-HV claims) increases the odds of a high-low discussion or agreement
on average by more than 4 times, and possibly more than 5 times, depending
on how the expected litigation costs are calculated.57 Although the overall base
likelihood of a high-low discussion occurring in these cases is fairly small, this
difference is nevertheless dramatic and substantively important.
With respect to LC-LV claims in the top half of Table 5, our data show no
statistically significant difference in the likelihood of high-low activity between
claims with above-median expected costs and claims with below-median costs
when outcome volatility is expected to be low, although the point estimate in
column 4 indicates that a discussion is approximately 50 percent more likely.
This result, too, makes sense in the context of our model because shifting from
a naked trial to a high-low agreement does not, in our model, reduce litigation
costs. Only fully settling a case has that consequence. Therefore, the preferred
choice between a high-low agreement and full adjudication should not differ
across claims if only the expected cost of litigation varies, unless high-low agree-
ments offer some means of lowering costs. The point estimate for LC-LV claims
hints at that possibility, and we explore the idea explicitly in Section 5 bymodeling
high-low agreements as commitment devices to restrain wasteful expenditures.
Finally, we assess the difference between HC-LV claims and LC-HV claims in
the relative likelihood of generating a high-low discussion or agreement (versus
proceeding to naked adjudication without a discussion). In line with our model,
we find that lower expected costs and higher expected outcome volatility increase
the odds of a high-low discussion between five- and ninefold. Taken together,
the results for HC-HV and LC-LV claims point to claim volatility as the likely
source for this increase: the differences in the HC-HV and LC-HV relative risk
ratios are not statistically significant, and the numbers for LC-LV claims show
that, as between naked adjudication with and without high-low activity, costs
may be irrelevant. Still, one could hypothesize that the differences in the point
estimates between the HC-HV and LC-HV claims imply some interaction be-
tween costs and volatility, with high litigation costs magnifying the role any
difference in outcome volatility may play.
With respect to settlement, our model also performs well, although not as
57 In Table 5, we use only fully litigated cases (without high-low agreements) to calculate expected
litigation costs. Each column uses a different set of exogenous variables (fixed at the time the claim
is filed) to predict expected litigation costs. We show all four sets of results because adding variables
to our prediction regressions results in the loss of observations, including cases with high-low agree-
ments, but improves the overall performance of these regressions in accounting for variation in
litigation costs.
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well as it does in explaining high-low discussions and without the same level of
statistical precision. In the bottom half of Table 5, with settlement as the outcome,
we expect the relative risk ratios on HC-HV to be larger than they are on LC-
HV, whereas with high-low activity as the outcome we expect the opposite re-
lationship. We find this to be true only in column 1. Nevertheless, the estimates
in all columns are similar to each other and statistically indistinguishable from
the value of 1. Only the coefficients on LC-LV regularly approach statistical
significance: LC-LV claims are only 75–85 percent as likely as HC-LV claims to
settle (as opposed to going to trial or arbitration without the parties discussing
the possibility of a high-low agreement), a result that is fully consistent with our
model’s predictions.
4.6. Robustness Checks
We perform a number of specifications and other checks within the context
of our multinomial framework and find that our results are robust. Section 4.5
included high-low discussions and agreements (rather than just high-low agree-
ments) because, in our view, high-low negotiations are arguably just as relevant
in thinking about settlement behavior and are more numerous ( ), whichnp 935
reduces the likelihood of any bias resulting from high-low agreements being
relatively rare events (see King and Zeng 2001).58 Nevertheless, claims with low
expected costs and high expected outcome volatility should generate relatively
more agreements, not just more discussions. In fact, the empirical relationship
with respect to agreements may be stronger if we happen to identify agreements
in our data more accurately than we do claims involving discussions or if dis-
cussions occur before parties have had the ability to conduct a full investigation
into the essential details of a claim (which leads to greater uncertainty about
the claim’s likely litigation costs and volatility).
The relationship of expected litigation costs and claim volatility to the like-
lihood of actual high-low agreements ( ) is shown in Table 6. Our findingsnp 246
again align with our model’s predictions about claim resolution behavior. The
estimates in Table 6 are slightly less precise than the ones presented in Table 5.
Nevertheless, we find statistically significant coefficients on LC-HV and even
larger relative risk ratio magnitudes. We also repeated the analysis while re-
stricting attention to only those claims resolved through trial or arbitration with
58 High-low discussions are not especially rare events in our sample. More than 2 percent of all
of the disputed claims in our data involved high-low discussions. More important, even if our
estimates were to suffer from rare-events bias, theoretical and Monte Carlo work by King and Zeng
(2001) shows that logit analyses tend to underestimate the probability of rare events (that is, high-
low discussions or high-low agreements), a bias that should run against the results we find. Moreover,
the extent of possible bias when the total number of observations (disputed claims) is almost 50,000,
as it is here, is unlikely to explain the large coefficients we find on LC-HV. Alternative approaches
to building our sample, such as endogenous stratified sampling, would more likely than not simply
increase the magnitude of our estimates.
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Table 6
Likelihood of High-Low Agreement and Full Settlement Relative to Trial or Arbitration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-low agreement:
HC-HV 4.167
(1.404)
[.05]
4.152
(1.383)
[.05]
5.053
(1.592)
[.03]
3.679
(1.188)
[.05]
LC-HV 6.977
(2.505)
[.04]
8.179
(2.707)
[.02]
10.191
(3.414)
[.02]
8.759
(3.048)
[.03]
LC-LV 1.483
(.612)
[.45]
1.629
(.603)
[.32]
1.902
(.708)
[.23]
1.341
(.536)
[.54]
Settlement:
HC-HV 1.082
(.071)
[.28]
1.113
(.073)
[.15]
1.030
(.077)
[.71]
1.043
(.098)
[.67]
LC-HV 1.000
(.100)
[1.00]
1.156
(.117)
[.21]
1.166
(.149)
[.29]
1.196
(.150)
[.22]
LC-LV .761
(.071)
[.01]
.866
(.082)
[.13]
.820
(.094)
[.09]
.804
(.096)
[.07]
Expected litigation costs:a
Set 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Set 2 Yes Yes Yes
Set 3 Yes Yes
Set 4 Yes
N 45,375 43,996 36,112 32,317
Note. Litigation costs are predicted using litigated cases. Estimates are reported as relative risk ratios. The
outcome variable captures whether a claim ever involved a high-low agreement and, if not, whether it
settled out of court or was resolved through trial or arbitration (excluded category). The independent
variables are indicators for the interaction between an indicator for whether the claim had above- or below-
median expected litigation costs and an indicator for whether the claim had above- or below-median
expected outcome variance. Therefore, HC-HV is one for claims with above-median (H) expected litigation
costs (C) and above-median (H) expected outcome variance (V) and zero otherwise, and so on. Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values are in brackets.
a Set 1 includes state of litigation fixed effects, accident region fixed effects, fixed effects for the insurance
company’s estimate of percentage of liability, year effects for when the accident was reported, fixed effects
for the number of persons injured in the event, fixed effects for type of injury or damage, a fatality indicator,
and an indicator for whether the line of business was automobile liability or general liability. Set 2 adds
state of accident fixed effects, the insurance policy claim limit, the population density of the insured’s
geographic area, and the insurance company’s estimates of incurred loss in months 3, 4, and 5 after the
filing of the claim. Set 3 adds variables about the area where the insured lives, the type of plaintiff (corporate
or individual), and the population density of the plaintiff’s geographic area. Set 4 adds an indicator for
the year in which the suit was filed.
high-low agreements in place ( ).59 Finally, to insure against the possibilitynp 99
that selection bias in our calculation of expected litigation costs might account
for our findings (see Section 4.1), we also reconstructed our expected litigation
59 We wind up with relatively few high-low claims to study with this approach, and the standard
errors that we estimate via bootstrapping are too large for us to say anything definitive. We view
these results as consistent with and weakly corroborative of the evidence we present.
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cost covariates using the actual costs of all claims in dispute (rather than just
fully litigated claims).60 The results of these last two exercises are similar to those
reported in Tables 5 and 6, and the magnitudes and patterns of the high-low
estimates remain consistent with our model’s predictions.
One concern with our empirical framework is the loss of information that
accompanies our making discrete the initially continuous litigation cost and
outcome variance measures into dichotomous variables to create just four types
of claims to compare. We find this approach attractive for two reasons. First,
without loss of generality, these simplifying steps make the presentation of our
results straightforward and the interpretation intuitive. More important (and yet
less obvious), the nature of the empirical problem that we face actually precludes
any simple use of continuous measures of expected costs and outcome variance
as independent variables in a regression framework.
In particular, our work hinges crucially on the facts that we have three unor-
dered outcomes (settlement, high-low activity, naked adjudication) and com-
plicated predictions about how costs and variance (and, in particular, their in-
teraction) influence the relative likelihood of these outcomes. High-low activity
should be more likely, according to our model and all else equal, when expected
litigation costs are low and when expected outcome variance is high (see Figure
1). With three unordered outcomes, an interaction term is necessary, but after
normalizing to make any results interpretable, a cost-variance interaction term
can take on the same value when expected litigation costs are low and outcome
variance is high or when costs are high and variance is low, which frustrates
alternative strategies to hypothesis testing.
To test the robustness of our results and to make better use of the information
contained in our data, we take the simple nonparametric approach of mapping
the likelihood of particular outcomes onto a space defined by expected litigation
costs and outcome variance quantiles and oriented to match the layout of Figure
1. In Figures 2–7, the more common a particular outcome (for example, a high-
low discussion, a high-low agreement, or adjudication under a high-low agree-
ment) in a quantile cell (relative to that same outcome in other cells), the darker
its shading. Figures 2 and 4 visually reproduce the key results of Tables 5 and
6, respectively. Figure 6 shows the relative likelihood of high-low adjudication.
Figures 3, 5, and 7 confirm the basic picture of Figures 2, 4, and 6 (and our
60 The high-low results of this test (reported in Table A2) show relative risk ratios that are similar
to those in Tables 5 and 6, but our findings on the relative likelihood of settlement (versus naked
adjudication) differ. In particular, an HC-HV claim appears to be 15–20 percent more likely to settle
than an HC-LV claim, a finding that is marginally statistically significant and at odds with the
insignificant results of Tables 5 and 6. Of course, this finding might stem from using all disputed
claims (even those that settle) to predict litigation costs. Because settlement avoids, by design, many
of the costs of fully litigated cases, including cost information from settled claims is likely to generate
a spurious correlation between high litigation costs and the decision to adjudicate a claim. But this
difference with Tables 5 and 6 is also entirely consistent with our model, which includes negotiation
and drafting costs for high-low agreements (kp and kd)—that is, in our model, a case with higher
than median volatility can be more likely to settle than cases with lower costs and lower volatility.
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Figure 2. Density of high-low discussions: 2 # 2 litigation cost–outcome variance space
Figure 3. Density of high-low discussions: 10 # 10 litigation cost–outcome variance space
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Figure 4. Density of high-low agreements: 2 # 2 litigation cost–outcome variance space
Figure 5. Density of high-low agreements: 10 # 10 litigation cost–outcome variance space
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Figure 6. Density of high-low adjudications: 2 # 2 litigation cost–outcome variance space
Figure 7. Density of high-low adjudications: 10 # 10 litigation cost–outcome variance space
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regression work) by cutting the data more finely, taking advantage of the variation
in the independent variables in a natural way.61
Finally, to further evaluate the soundness of our empirical approach, we es-
timated three simple, straightforward dichotomous-choice logit models (one for
each outcome) with expected litigation costs and outcome variance entering
separately as continuous independent variables.62 This empirical strategy departs
significantly from our motivating model’s structure and underlying assumptions,
but it allows us to investigate the consequences of incorporating continuous
measures of expected litigation cost and outcome variance and relaxing the
independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives assumption that accompanies the use of
the multinomial logit in equation (3).63 The results of these exercises are con-
sistent with the preceding analysis.
5. High-Low Agreements as a Mechanism to Limit Rent Seeking
The framework developed in Section 2 treated litigation costs as if they were
set exogenously. In practice, however, litigation costs are determined endoge-
nously by the choices the parties make: plaintiffs and defendants choose how
much to invest in litigating their cases in light of the risks and potential rewards
at trial. In many settings, the investment incentives of a plaintiff and a defendant
may be excessive in the sense that both parties would be better off if they could
each agree to spend less. By restricting the potential award to a narrower range,
high-low agreements may, in theory, serve as a commitment device to limit rent-
seeking activities and reduce litigation costs.
To illustrate, consider a rent-seeking contest between two risk-neutral parties
in which greater litigation expenditures improve a litigant’s odds of prevailing
at trial:64 the court awards high damages (xH) with probability
1/2p b (e p
and low damages (xL) with probability , where p is
1/2 1/2 1/2e ) 1 p b (e  e )d p d
exogenously given, ep and ed represent each side’s litigation expenditures, and b
captures the trial outcome’s sensitivity to those expenditures by the parties.
Absent any agreement, the Nash equilibrium spending levels increase mon-
61 To clarify, Figures 2–7 report the relative density of cases at the intersection of each expected
litigation cost quantile and each outcome variance quantile. Expected litigation costs were predicted
using litigated cases; see the text or the notes to Tables 5 or 6 for further explanation.
62 In particular, we separately regressed whether a claim settled on expected litigation costs and
outcome variance (treating all trial and arbitration outcomes as identical), whether the parties dis-
cussed or entered into a high-low agreement on expected litigation costs and outcome variance
(grouping settlement and naked trials and arbitrations together), and whether the parties discussed
or entered into a high-low agreement conditional on the claim not fully settling (nesting the choices
by assuming that the parties first decide whether to settle and then whether to enter into a high-
low agreement).
63 Importantly, the independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives assumption appears reasonably likely
to hold in this context. Not one of the relevant outcomes—full settlement, a high-low agreement,
or naked adjudication—is anywhere close to a perfect substitute for one of the others.
64 See, for example, Tullock (1980), Dixit (1987), and Siegel (2009) for related work on contest
models.
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otonically in , the spread of possible trial outcomes.65 In particular,x  xH L
2 2b (x  x )H Le p e p . (4)p d 4
By contractually restricting the spread of possible trial outcomes, however, lit-
igants can commit themselves to invest less in the litigation—indeed, to invest
the jointly optimal level. In particular, when , the set of Pareto-optimalp 1 pp d
contracts will satisfy the following equation:66
(p  p )p ds p s  . (5)L H 2b
Intuitively, when litigants are mutually optimistic ( ), they jointly benefitp 1 pp d
from the speculation value of trial, but they also want to avoid squandering that
joint benefit by making offsetting investments (wasteful rent seeking) that are
nonetheless privately optimal in a noncooperative setting. The contract trades
off these two objectives. Both parties would rather maximize their joint benefit
by agreeing to reduce their litigation expenditure levels, and assuming that parties
cannot verify spending and so cannot contract on that behavior directly, a high-
low agreement can accomplish this same goal indirectly by reducing the sensitivity
of the final outcome to these investments. Note that the high-low spread,
, is smaller when b is larger, which means that when outcomes are mores  sH L
sensitive to expenditures, litigants have an even greater incentive to constrain
their costs through a tighter high-low spread.
Some of the predictions of this rent-seeking model are, at a superficial level,
similar to those of our original model: parties will tend to adopt high-low
contracts when the spread is large (because naked adjudication wouldx  xH L
lead to excessive spending) and when litigation costs are not too high (for
otherwise they would prefer to settle out of court). The rent-seeking model has
the further empirical prediction, however, that a high-low agreement will cause
the parties to reduce their subsequent litigation expenditures. One possible (and
potentially observable) consequence, therefore, would be a decline (or a slower
increase relative to those claims not governed by a high-low agreement) in
litigation expenditures by both parties after a high-low agreement.
To evaluate this prediction, we examined whether monthly litigation expen-
ditures for claims with high-low agreements in place were lower, all else equal,
after the parties entered into the agreements. In particular, we regressed claim-
level monthly total litigation expenditures (and outside-counsel fees) on an in-
dicator that a high-low agreement was concluded, claim-specific effects, claim
65 The plaintiff’s payoff at trial is . Dif-.5 .5 .5 .5[p b (e  e )] x  [1 p b (e  e )] x  e  cp d H p d L p p
ferentiating this expression gives the expression for ep in the text. Similarly, one can derive ed.
66 The joint benefit of going to trial is , where cp and
2 2(p  p )(s  s ) (b /2)(s  s )  c  cp d H L H L p d
are fixed litigation costs. Differentiating this expression with respect to establishes the result.c s  sd H L
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characteristics that vary over time, and time fixed effects.67 To account for any
remaining unobservables and to test whether monthly litigation expenditures
may simply have grown at a slower rate after the high-low agreement, we also
compared the spending patterns in high-low cases with those in cases in which
a high-low agreement was discussed or negotiated but never concluded.68 Despite
exploring various error structures and alternative specifications, we found no
consistent differences in monthly litigation expenses between claims with a bind-
ing high-low agreement in place and all others.69
Of course, even a precisely estimated zero effect would not repudiate our
excessive-rent-seeking theory. Litigants may be able to identify claims that are
likely to involve high-low agreements and so reduce or delay spending in advance
of entering into such an agreement. Litigation costs may also be fixed in the
short run, especially for litigants, like our insurer, that employ legal staffs.70 Still,
our findings hint that limiting rent seeking may only rarely account for high-
low agreements, and there are strong theoretical arguments to support that
interpretation. Most prominent, private parties may have other commitment
devices at their disposal to limit their litigation expenditures. For example, lit-
igants can concede certain issues and litigate only the remaining ones,71 and
litigants can—and do—write contracts that explicitly constrain the presentation
of evidence, including restrictions on the number of witnesses or the hours or
scope of testimony. In short, parties may not need high-low agreements to limit
excessive rent seeking when they can do so directly through explicit contractual
limitations on activities that are costly.
6. Conclusion
This article presents the first systematic study of high-low agreements, an
increasingly popular contractual device in civil litigation in the United States.
We show formally that when at least one party is risk averse and both litigants
are sufficiently optimistic about their prospects at trial, high-low agreements may
67 We also explore outside-counsel fees as a dependent variable because they may be more likely
than total litigation expenditures (which have fixed components) to reflect immediate changes in
spending.
68 We assume that claims involving high-low discussions are sufficiently similar to claims with
high-low agreements in place to serve as an appropriate comparison group. To the extent that
discussions do not fail randomly, however, our estimates represent a combination of the effects of
the high-low agreement and the unobserved differences between these two groups.
69 The rent-seeking story might imply that litigants would adopt high-low agreements early in the
litigation process, before significant investments have been made. This is not true empirically. As
shown in Table 3, high-low agreements are reached on average at 31.91 months into the dispute,
which is approximately 80 percent of the time to trial.
70 Monthly expenditure totals may also be less reliable than overall spending totals, as expenditures
may be recorded months after commitments to pay for goods or services were made.
71 See Noyes (2006) for a discussion of courts’ acceptance of contracts that waive statutory rights
and rules, such as waivers of notice and hearing and contracts that modify discovery requirements
and limitations.
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arise endogenously because they can eliminate extreme outcomes while still
allowing scope for mutually profitable disagreement. We evaluate this proposition
empirically using insurance claims data and find that high-low discussions and
agreements are relatively more common when outcomes are more uncertain and
expected litigation costs are low. Our results are statistically and practically sig-
nificant and robust to alternative specifications.
Our work moves beyond the existing literature on settlement in civil litigation,
which primarily focuses on only the extreme ends of the dispute resolution
spectrum—cases that are fully settled or dropped and cases that proceed to full-
blown trial. In reality, dispute resolution occurs on a continuum. For example,
to reduce costs, parties can opt to arbitrate (in essence, agree to ignore certain
procedural requirements and waive the need for judges and juries in favor of
third-party fact finders). Likewise, parties can agree to stipulate to certain facts
or points of law while still allowing a judge or jury to decide many key issues.
These practices make plain that settlement behavior in litigation includes far
more than simply out-of-court settlement.72
High-low agreements (and incomplete settlement arrangements generally) also
raise public policy issues that deserve attention but that are beyond the scope
of this article. For instance, because these private agreements mitigate the risk
of trial for litigants, they decrease the attractiveness of full settlement, and there-
fore they should increase the demand for trials (constrained by high-low agree-
ments) that require courts and other publicly provided resources. Furthermore,
because litigants are not required to disclose the existence of a high-low agree-
ment, the availability of these arrangements may lead to a misallocation of scarce
adjudicatory resources if judges or juries make decisions on the assumption that
disputes involve greater stakes than they actually do.73
Appendix A
Additional Data Description
The insurer, which insisted on anonymity as a condition of allowing us to
use its data, provided us with detailed information on all claims that were either
closed or open at any point between January 1, 2004, and March 31, 2009. The
raw claims data included approximately 570,000 total claims. Because we do not
know how open claims were eventually resolved or will resolve, we do not use
them in our analysis. By also removing claims that were missing extensive in-
72 Of course, the cost-reducing benefits of arbitration are well recognized, but arbitration’s rela-
tionship to the broader class of settlement contracts and the risk-reducing mechanisms that we
highlight here, such as high-low agreements, remains underdeveloped.
73 Additional distortions may arise for jurisdictional reasons. For example, imagine a lawsuit alleging
$100,000 in damages, above the $75,000 federal jurisdiction amount-in-controversy requirement. If
a secret high-low agreement limits possible damages to between $40,000 and $60,000, the effective
amount in controversy is only $20,000. One can even imagine an out-of-court full settlement (for
example, a $50,000 payment regardless) between parties who seek, on the public’s dime, a jury’s
determination of who was right, after all.
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formation or were outliers in subject matter, geography, or timing, we constructed
a clean data set of approximately 385,000 claims.
The clean data set consists of two types of claims: claims resolved adminis-
tratively through a claim handler and disputed claims. For our purposes, we
define a claim as being in dispute if either (1) positive litigation costs are recorded
by the insurer’s in-house legal counsel or an outside firm or (2) a suit date is
recorded (which occurs when the insurer receives notice that the plaintiff has
filed a complaint, at which point the insurer refers to the claim as being in suit).
A little more than 12 percent, or about 48,350, of the claims were in dispute
using our definition. Approximately 5 percent of the disputed claims, or about
2,600 claims, were actually litigated (resolved by trial or arbitration). Most non-
administrative claims involve both a suit date and positive litigation costs, but
a small fraction involve only one or the other. In Table A3, we provide summary
statistics for the data, and we include alternative broad and narrow measures of
the disputed claims category by using the union and intersection of conditions
1 and 2, respectively.
When a claimant notifies the insurer of a claim against one of its policies, the
insurer first internally assesses the claim to determine to what extent, if any, the
policyholder is responsible for the alleged harm. On the basis of this determi-
nation, the insurer attempts to resolve the claim through one of its claims agents.
Most claims are resolved in this way, essentially administratively. If the claims
agent is unable to resolve the claim through negotiation, and the claimant sub-
sequently files suit, the insurer continues in its efforts to settle the claim but
assigns either its own in-house legal staff or outside legal counsel to manage the
claim. Consistent with most litigation, suits against the insurer typically end in
settlement, with a small percentage proceeding to trial or arbitration.
For each claim it receives, the insurer records the date of the alleged harm,
the date the insurer received notice of the claim, and the close date (that is,
when the claim is resolved, regardless of its disposition). With these dates, it is
possible to calculate the duration of each claim. In addition, the insurer gathers
detailed information about the alleged harm and its likely litigation value. Of
particular interest, the insurance company makes an initial assessment of the
harm and the extent of its perceived liability but also subsequently records a
second prelitigation evaluation of the likely value of the claim. It also records
the state (and sometimes city) in which the accident or harm occurred and
maintains demographic information about the area in which the insured and
claimant (plaintiff) lives or lived. For all claims, the insurer also documents the
amount it ultimately paid out, if anything, to the claimant, as well as any legal
fees or other legal expenses it incurred along the way. Each record also contains
the policy limit for the policyholder (which affects how the insurer handles the
claim) and information about how long the insured had been covered by the
policy and when it became effective.
For approximately 80 percent of the claims, the insurer noted whether the
plaintiff was an individual or a business. The company also records extremely
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Table A1
Additional Summary Statistics: Litigated and High-Low Claims
Trial or
Arbitration
High-Low
Discussions
High-Low
Agreements
N 2,636 935 246
Claims by year closed:
2004 312 138 27
2005 450 150 28
2006 558 180 53
2007 574 206 68
2008 615 230 61
2009 127 31 9
Type of claim:
Auto liability 983 590 165
General liability 1,653 345 81
Region where claim arose (%):
Northeast 41.08 68.02 68.70
South 26.25 13.90 15.85
Midwest 8.88 6.84 6.10
West 23.18 10.91 8.94
Pacific .57 .32 .41
Claimant characteristics:
Claimant type (%):
Firm or business 10.1 1.5 2.4
Individual 86.3 92.1 91.1
Unknown 3.6 6.4 6.5
Part of body injured (%):
Fatality 2.2 1.6 .4
Head 5.8 8.5 7.7
Lower extremities 13.0 14.2 15.5
Multiple injuries 3.2 1.1 .4
Neck 13.0 9.4 8.9
Spinal 4.4 10.6 11.4
Trunk 24.3 38.3 38.2
Upper extremities 8.2 12.7 12.6
Personal injury 4.8 1.1 1.6
Unreported 21.2 2.6 3.3
Average claim characteristics:
Duration of claim (months) 28.45
(19.02)
37.28
(18.49)
39.43
(15.79)
Initial reserve ($) 7,012
(13,474)
7,055
(12,425)
5,683
(8,876)
Loss paid ($) 32,392
(126,757)
93,426
(174,682)
87,876
(140,041)
Insurer litigation costs ($) 13,880
(34,280)
14,215
(31,792)
12,662
(20,736)
Policy limit per person ($) 974,916
(879,177)
632,594
(740,183)
542,277
(614,334)
Policy limit per event ($) 1,389,592
(2,394,692)
878,318
(801,791)
795,281
(791,954)
Note. Values are computed from machine data or litigation notes provided by the insurer. Financial values
are reported in 2008 dollars. Claims with high-low discussions include claims in which the parties at least
raised in settlement negotiations the possibility of a high-low agreement. Claims with a high-low agreement
include claims with high-low discussions in which the parties reached an actual agreement. Because some
high-low agreements were subsequently resolved through settlement, claims resolved through trial or
arbitration include some but not all of the high-low discussions and agreements. Standard deviations are
in parentheses.
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detailed information about the type of harm allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.
Possible harms include property (or economic) damage, personal injury or death,
or, in many instances, both. Property or economic damage and personal injury
raise different concerns for the insurer. With property or economic damage, the
magnitude of harm is typically quantifiable using market measures, leaving li-
ability as the central issue. By contrast, claims involving personal injury require
the insurer to determine both the magnitude of the harm as well as the extent
of liability, so the insurer catalogs the part of the body allegedly harmed (for
example, head, neck, spine) as well as the nature of the injury (for example,
contusion, sprain, fracture). If there are multiple injuries, the insurer notes them,
as well as whether other people were injured during the loss event and other
indicators of injury (the use of an ambulance, for example).
As the summary statistics in Table A3 suggest, in-dispute claims are different
from administratively handled claims. The fatality rate is more than four times
higher in disputed claims than in administrative claims. In addition, a disputed
claim takes on average four times longer to resolve and involves payouts eight
times greater than an administrative claim. The insurer tracks how the claim
resolved, whether by settlement, arbitration, or trial. Table 1 reports the same
statistics as Table A3, broken down by whether the claim involved a high-low
discussion (irrespective of whether the parties reached a high-low agreement or
how the claim was ultimately resolved), was resolved through settlement without
a high-low discussion, or was resolved by trial or arbitration without a high-
low discussion. Consistent with existing literature on settlement rates (Galanter
1994), the vast majority of claims (95 percent) were resolved without formal
adjudication.
The insurer does not store any of its settlement agreements (including even
whether there was a written or oral high-low agreement in place) in its standard,
uniformly coded and collected electronic records. However, the insurer does
keep extensive electronic narrative records on how the claim is handled while
it is in dispute. Claim handlers, lawyers, and anyone else involved with a claim
enter their notes as claims evolve, although the notes are not entirely complete
and can be difficult to decipher.
To extract information about high-low agreements from these notes (which
run at least many dozens of pages per in-dispute claim when aggregated), we
worked with the insurer to design an algorithm that extracted chunks of text
surrounding references to a high-low agreement. The algorithm was designed
to identify the many ways in which different people might have referred to high-
low agreements in the notes: for example, “hi-lo,” “high/low,” and “hi/low.”
A single claim often gave rise to several notes, depending on the frequency
of high-low references. All notes included the following:
1. Event ID: the underlying event giving rise to one or more claims;
2. Claim ID: the specific claim corresponding to a given event;
3. Note ID: an individual identifier for the specific note;
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4. Note type: the category of note, for example, negotiation, legal, medical,
and so on;
5. Note date: the date corresponding to the note; and
6. Note count: the total number of notes attached to the claim.
The algorithm also recorded how many times the variation of the term appeared
in the claim notes. For privacy reasons, notes were redacted to exclude names,
addresses, social security numbers, and other sensitive information.
We read through a large sample of complete case notes and algorithm-extracted
chunks of text to better understand the scope of the notes and to design a coding
regimen. Research assistants completed the coding and double-checking of the
data. For each of these claims with relevant high-low agreement information,
we read the available narrative information and recorded the context in which
the high-low agreement arose, whether the parties reached an actual agreement,
as well as other potentially useful information, such as the number of back-and-
forth proposals, relevant dates, and the proximity of the discussion to trial or
arbitration, if apparent.
When the redactions inhibited our ability to understand the notes, we re-
quested additional information from the insurer. Officials at the insurer either
helped us to determine the substance of the notes or forwarded hand-redacted
notes. These notes were then recombined with the existing notes for those claims.
The same procedure was used for both auto and general liability claims. The
high-low data were structured such that each row in a spreadsheet contained a
new note and all of the information that we had about that note. The data were
sorted by event ID to determine whether there were multiple claims for an event,
then sorted by claim ID to group each claim together, then sorted by date so
that the notes were in chronological order within each claim. We ultimately
coded a total of almost 300,000 text entries (many for each claim).
From the claim notes identified and redacted by the text-mining algorithm, we
collected the following information on high-low discussions and agreements:
H-L Discussion Level. Measures the extent of high-low discussion. A 0 in-
dicates that a high-low agreement was mentioned by the insurer but there was
no discussion between the parties. A 1 indicates that a high-low agreement was
mentioned by one party but the other party was not interested. A 2 indicates
that an arrangement was discussed and seriously considered by both sides but
that no high-low agreement was ever reached. Any interest on the part of op-
posing counsel (such as “let me check with my client”) received a 2 coding. A
3 indicates that a high-low agreement was made. A 4 indicates that the interest
level is unknown or unclear.
Party Type. Identifies the party initiating the high-low discussion. A 1 in-
dicates that the insurer raised the possibility of a high-low agreement. A 2 means
that the plaintiff raised the possibility. A 3 indicates that a codefendant (such
as another insurance company also involved in the litigation) proposed the idea.
A 4 means that it is unclear from the notes which party raised the possibility.
A 5 indicates that a judge raised the notion.
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Date H-L Raised. Captures the date of the first registered mention of a high-
low agreement.
H-L Context. Records the stage of the litigation at which the discussion of
the high-low agreement occurred. A 0 represents a very early planning/negoti-
ation stage, 1 is for arbitration, 2 is for mediation, and 3 is for trial.
Date H-L Reached. If applicable, catalogs the date on which the parties agreed
to a high-low arrangement.
High. If applicable, contains the high of the agreement.
Low. If applicable, contains the low of the agreement.
Claim Resolution. Categorizes how the claim was eventually resolved. A 1 is
for arbitration, a 2 is for mediation, a 3 is for trial, a 4 is for settlement, a 5 is
for a dismissal or dropped case, and a 6 is for when the notes did not provide
sufficient information to determine the resolution.
In the rare event that claims involved multiple parties and multiple distinct
high-low agreements, we recorded the information in multiple separate rows as
if there were separate agreements on potentially distinct claims. We then deter-
mined the appropriate treatment on the basis of the facts and procedural posture
of the case.
We also collected information on whether a claim involved multiple high-low
proposals, and, if so, we recorded the terms of each offer or demand, up to
three proposals. (In a few instances, the notes did not report the actual terms
of any high-low proposal.) These proposals usually, but not necessarily, resulted
in the parties reaching a high-low agreement. Finally, we kept track of any
information indicating the motivation or thinking of the lawyers or other insurer
personnel in engaging in a high-low negotiation or agreement and also recorded
any other information possibly relevant to analyzing the case.
As an internal check, many claims (several hundred) were coded redundantly
to ensure accuracy. Subsequent spot-checking also revealed that coding was highly
consistent. Research assistants also recorded the certainty of their coding. A claim
coded as a 1 was evaluated by another research assistant or by one of us, a 2
indicated that the claim required additional attention, and a 3 meant that the
research assistant had high confidence in the coding.
Appendix B
Proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1
B1. Proof of Lemma 1
Using equation (1), the award-modification contract would satisfy
a (s c k ) a (s c k )p H p p d H d dp a e p a ep p d dp .
a (s c k ) a (s c k )p L p p d L d d(1 p )a e (1 p )a ep p d d
The litigation and negotiation costs drop out, which gives
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a s a sp H d Hp e p ep dp .
a s a sp L d L(1 p )e (1 p )ep d
Rearranging this expression yields
(1/p ) 1d (a a )(s s )p d H Lp e .[ ](1/p ) 1p
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides and rearranging terms gives the result.
Q.E.D.
B2. Proof of Proposition 1
We first characterize the situations in which the parties would jointly prefer
settlement to a naked trial. Suppose there is an ordinary settlement contract, s,
that is better for both litigants. For the plaintiff, it must be the case that
exp[a s] 1 p exp[a (x  c )] (1 p )exp[a (x  c )].p p p H p p p L p
Rearranging terms, this establishes a lower bound, , for the settlement amount:s
a x a xp H p Ls 1 sp c  (1/a ) ln [p e  (1 p )e ]p p p p
a (x x )p H Lp c  x  (1/a ) ln [p e  1 p ].p L p p p
Similarly for the defendant, settling must be better than going to trial, so
 exp [a s] 1 p exp [a (x  c )] (1 p ) exp [a (x  c )].d d d H d d d L d
Rearranging terms, we establish an upper bound, , for the settlement amount:s¯
a x a xd H d L¯s ! sp c  (1/a ) ln [p e  (1 p )e ]d d d p
a (x x )d H Lp c  x  (1/a ) ln [p e  1 p ].d L d d d
So a mutually acceptable settlement amount exists if and only if , or when¯s ! s
a (x x ) a (x x )p H L d H Lc  c 1 (1/a ) ln [1 p  p e ] (1/a ) ln [1 p  p e ].p d p p p d d d
We rename the right-hand side ; pp, pd, ap, ad), and we suppressf(x  xH L
notation and rewrite it as . Note that . Differentiatingf(x  x ) f(0)p 0H L
tells us that it is increasing if and only iff(x  x )H L
a (x x ) a (x x )p H L d H Lp e p ep d 1 0,
a (x x ) a (x x )p H L d H L1 p  p e 1 p  p ep p d d
which is true if and only if
(1 p )/pd d (a a )(x x )p d H L1 e
(1 p )/pp p
or, equivalently, , where D* is defined in the text.x  x ! D*H L
When , then . Since is a decreasing function for allp ! p D* ! 0 f(x  x )p d H L
and , we conclude that for allx  x 1 D* f(0)p 0 f(x  x ) ! 0 x H L H L H
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. So the parties would prefer settlement to a naked trial. If contracts werex 1 0L
unrestricted, they might want to sign a contract with . Under assumptions 1 sL H
1, the constraint that is binding, so the parties can do no better thans ≤ sL H
settling out of court.
When , then . When , then .p ! p D* 1 0 x  x  (0, D*) f(x  x ) 1 0p d H L H L
The Pareto-optimal contract modification would am-s  s p D* 1 x  xH L H L
plify the risk at trial, violating assumption 1. So for , the partiesx  x  (0, D*)H L
would never opt for a high-low agreement. In this region, the parties will either
settle out of court or pursue a naked trial. When , then the contractx  x 1 D*H L
does not violate assumption 1. The parties will prefers  s p D* ! x  xH L H L
a high-low contract with to a naked trial when the joint net values  s p D*H L
of the high-low contract is larger than the joint value of a naked trial, or
f(D*) (c  c ) (k  k ) 1 f(x  x ) (c  c )p d p d H L p d
or, equivalently,
˜f(x  x ) ! f(D)p f(D*) (k  k ).H L p d
The value exists because decreases without bound whenD˜ 1 D* f(x  x )H L
goes to infinity. Finally, when . When˜x  x f(D) 1 0 k  k ! f (D*) x H L p d H
, the parties will pursue trial with a high-low agreement when˜x 1 D c  c !L p d
and will settle out of court whenf (D*) (k  k ) c  c 1 f (D*) (k p d p d p
. Q.E.D.k )d
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